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Abstract:  
  
Previous models of the popular vote in U.S. Presidential elections emphasize economic growth 
and price stability, the role of parties and incumbency, and pre-election expectations for the 
future. Despite the closeness of the pre-election polls in 2004, formal models instead predict a 
landslide victory for President Bush.  An obvious question is whether this anomaly arises, at 
least in part, from national security concerns – in particular, the conflict in Iraq. We explore this 
pre-election anomaly by introducing two opposing electoral forces capturing national security 
concerns, which for the 2004 election reduces President Bush's predicted vote share.  In general, 
the impact of national security concerns on the vote share of the incumbent (or the incumbent's 
party) can be substantial, whether positive, as in the 1944 election during World War II, or 
negative, as in the 1952 election during the Korean war and the 1968 election during the 
Vietnam war.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
In this paper we explore the role of national security issues in determining the popular 
vote in Presidential elections in the United States. Prior to the 1992 election, models of the 
popular vote for President (e.g., Fair, 1978 and 1988) emphasized a dominant role for economic 
growth and price stability in closely replicating the popular vote. However, in 1992 these models 
falsely predicted a landslide victory for the incumbent, President George H.W. Bush. Instead, he 
lost in a close election to Governor William Clinton. In response to the shortcomings of earlier 
models in the 1992 election, subsequent studies (e.g., Gleisner 1992, Haynes and Stone 1994, 
and Fair 1996) introduced additional factors, e.g., how long the incumbent party has held the 
Presidency, whether or not the nominee of the incumbent party is also the incumbent President, 
the number of quarters of exceptionally high growth (above 3.2%), and the rate of change in the 
Dow-Jones stock market average in the period prior to the election. These factors in various 
forms not only improved estimates of the 1992 election, but also improved predictions of the 
popular vote in the later 1996 and 2000 elections. 
 
Model predictions prior to the 2004 election again appear to pose a quandary. As in 1992, 
the models predict a landslide victory in the popular vote for the incumbent President (e.g., Fair 
2004), ironically for President George W. Bush, the son of the former President Bush. As 
columnist Tom Raum (2003) put it, “American Presidents seeking re-election almost always try 
to rev up the economy a year or so out.  George W. Bush is no exception. And he has a big 
advantage over most of his predecessors, including his father: an obliging same-party Congress 
and an accommodating Federal Reserve.” Yet most polls predict a close race with his 
Democratic challenger, Senator John Kerry.  Why?  Of course, the polls could turn out to be 
wrong in accurately reflecting what the popular vote will be in November, in which case there is 
no quandary. However, the models may also again be wrong because they have not accurately 
captured other important factors important to voters. Indeed, no model can accurately project the 
role of every factor. The relevant question is whether the models are wrong in predictable, 
rectifiable ways.   
 
The most obvious omitted factor in the current election campaign is the conflict in Iraq. 
Rep. Paul Ryan (R-Wisconsin) argued earlier in 2004 that “The economy is firing on all 
cylinders … and it’s completely overshadowed by Iraq.”  Despite signs of a slowing economy in 
the latter half of 2004, Rep. Ryan’s explanation that the conflict in Iraq overshadows the current 
election is compelling.  Even so, how can national security be introduced in measurable ways 
into a formal model?  Many have argued informally that a typical response of voters to armed 
conflict is to “rally round the flag” in support of the incumbent President, and indeed that is 
consistent with the post-September 11, 2001 popular support for President Bush. But that 
explanation would push model predictions toward an even greater margin of victory for 
President Bush. If Iraq explained at least part of the divergence between the polls and the 
model’s predictions, then the role of armed conflicts and national security must be more 
complex, as one might expect. 
 
In this paper, we introduce two factors, working in opposition, to account more fully for 
the potential role of armed conflicts and national security. These factors reduce President Bush's 
predicted vote share in the 2004 election, thereby narrowing the divergence between the model's 
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prediction and the election polls.  In general, the impact of national security concerns on the vote 
share of the incumbent (or the incumbent's party) can be substantial, whether positive, as in the 
case of the 1944 election during World War II, or negative, as in the cases of the 1952 election 
during the Korean war and the 1968 election during the Vietnam war.  
 
2.  Model 
  
The point of departure for our model is Fair's (1978, 1988) framework, where voter 
utility (U) is determined by economic performance (E) and non-economic factors (N).   
 
                                                               U = U[E, N]                                                      (1) 
 
The voter then chooses either the Democratic candidate D or Republican candidate R based on 
expected outcomes of E and N for each party. Thus, the probability V that a Democrat is chosen 
over a Republican depends on the difference between the corresponding expected utilities for the 
two political parties (see Judge et al 1985, p. 769, for a general derivation): 
 
                                                           V = prob [UR —UD]                        (2) 
 
In the present context, V is interpreted at the aggregate level as the Democratic share of the two-
party vote.  Although V is a continuous variable, it is bounded between zero and one.  However, 
the log-odds transformation is unbounded, permitting estimation with ordinary least squares 
(OLS):1
 
                                                        VOTE = log[V/(1-V]     (3) 
               
Our primary contribution is the inclusion of national security concerns as a key 
component of non-economic determinants, N. The few previous studies that have considered the 
issue have specified only one dimension of national security, e.g., the magnitude of the 
commitment to the military or simply a dummy variable for world wars, and have typically 
assumed that this strengthens the vote share of the incumbent party. However, even in the 
context of popular wars, costs are associated with national defense that may weaken the vote 
share of an incumbent party, all else the same. Voters presumably prefer goods and benefits at 
the lowest cost, even in armed conflicts.2
 
                                                 
1 In our sample, both observed and predicted values of V in linear specifications are concentrated 
toward the middle of the range, with none outside the range.  Even so, we use the log-odds 
transformation to avoid potential issues beyond the current sample.   Given the very limited 
number of observations, OLS estimation is useful given its desirable small sample properties. 
 
2 In Haynes and Stone (1994), we explored this potential tension by introducing both direct and 
indirect effects of military factors, the latter affecting the importance of the standard economic 
variables.  Below, we find that the direct effects dominate in the current specifications. 
 2
3.  Estimation Equations and Data  
 
We employ two alternative base specifications, to which proxies for national security are 
added. The first specification combines the essential elements of Fair (1978), extended by 
Gleisner (1992) to include a variable on the Dow-Jones stock market performance, and Haynes 
and Stone (1994) to include a variable on the number of consecutive terms the incumbent party 
has been in office. We also explore the robustness of our findings in a second specification used 
more recently by Fair (1996, 2002).  Eq. (4) summarizes the first specification, where expected 
signs are listed above the regressors and the variables are defined below the equation.  
                   ?                 -                       +                    +              -                   
        VOTE = f[PARTY, DURATION1, DOWJONES, GROWTH1, INFLATION1]          (4) 
 
where  VOTE = log[V/(1-V)], where V is the incumbent share of the two-party Presidential vote;  
PARTY = 1 if incumbent is a Democrat, and -1 if a Republican;  
DURATION1 = number of consecutive terms the incumbent party has been in power; 
DOWJONES = annual rate of change in the Dow-Jones, January to October of election year; 
GROWTH1 = annual growth rate of real per capita GNP (GDP) in 2d and 3d quarters of                                       
     election year;3   
INFLATION1 = absolute value of the annualized inflation rate (GNP/GDP deflator) in the two-             
     year period prior to the election. 
  
The alternative base specification follows that of Fair (1996, 2002): 
                         ?              ?                   -                      +                  
VOTE=f[PARTY, PERSON, DURATION2, GOODNEWS, 
+               +                  - 
                                            WAR, GROWTH2, INFLATION2]       (5) 
 
where VOTE and PARTY are defined above;  
PERSON = 1 if the incumbent is running for election and 0 otherwise; 
DURATION2 = 0 if the incumbent party was in power for one term, 1 for two consecutive  
     terms, 1.25 for three consecutive terms, 1.5 for four consecutive terms, etc; 
GOODNEWS = number of quarters in the first 15 quarters of the administration in which the  
     growth rate of real per capita GDP is greater than 3.2 percent at an annual rate except for  
     1920, 1944, and 1948, where the values are zero; 
WAR = 1 for the elections of 1920, 1944, and 1948, and 0 otherwise; 
GROWTH2 =  annual growth rate of real per capita GDP in the first 3 quarters of election year; 
INFLATION2 = absolute value of the growth rate of the GDP deflator in the first 15 quarters of 
     the administration (annualized) except for 1920, 1944, and 1948, where values are zero. 
 
We turn, now, to the question of how best to capture the potentially conflicting forces at 
work regarding national security and defense. For a measure of positive support, we employ 
ARMY, the annualized percentage change in the proportion of the population in the armed forces 
                                                 
3 To maintain consistency with prior data and analyses, estimates of eq. (4) use real per capita 
GNP for 1992 and earlier years, and real per capital GDP in subsequent years, with the two 
series scaled to be identical in 1996.  Estimates are insensitive to the distinction. 
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over the previous two years, as a factor in “support for the troops” and “rally round the flag” 
forces in favor of an incumbent President. For a counter measure, we employ ARMYSPEND, 
the annualized percentage change in the proportion of government spending devoted to national 
security over the previous two years, as a measure of the costs of national defense.4 We also 
combine the measures in ARMYDIFF, defined as ARMY minus ARMYSPEND.   
 
Our sample begins with the 1908 Presidential election, following Gleisner (1992) and 
Haynes and Stone (1994). Data used to estimate eq. (4) are from Haynes and Stone (1994), 
updated as detailed in the data appendix.  Data for eq. (5) are from Fair (2002, 2004).  While 
similar, the estimates differ modestly because of somewhat different proxies and because some 
variables are specified over different time horizons.  We present estimates of both specifications, 
since the objective is to explore the importance and robustness of national security variables, not 
to select between the two base specifications. 
 
4.  Estimates 
 
The dependent variable, VOTE, is the log-odds ratio for V, the incumbent share of the 
two-party Presidential vote. The first column in Table 1 presents ordinary least squares estimates 
of eq. (4), with t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-corrected or robust (White) standard errors 
in parentheses.5 The coefficient on the PARTY variable is negative and significant, indicating a 
net Republican advantage.6 Coefficients on the remaining regressors have the predicted signs, 
and all are significant except inflation. These estimates are generally consistent with previous 
studies. The second column in Table 1 reports estimates after ARMY and ARMYSPEND are 
added to eq. (4). Coefficients on these national security variables have the correct expected signs 
and are significant at the five percent level. The final column in Table 1 presents estimates after 
inclusion of ARMYDIFF, where the coefficients for ARMY and ARMYSPEND are restricted to 
be equal and opposite in sign, and the coefficient on ARMYDIFF is correctly signed and 
significant at one percent.7  
 
Table 2 repeats the analysis of Table 1, but is based on the Fair (2002) specification, 
definition of variables, and data.  The first column of Table 2 presents ordinary least squares 
estimates of eq. (5). The coefficient on PARTY is again negative and significant, and the 
PERSON and WAR coefficients are insignificant.  The remaining variables have significant 
                                                 
4 Estimates are not qualitatively sensitive to using longer time periods (e.g., the full 15 quarters 
prior to the election), instead of just the two years prior to the election. 
5 For all estimates, the White test fails to reject homoskedasticity at the five percent level (e.g., 
the relevant chi square test statistic is 9.27 for column two, Table 1, and 8.14 for column two, 
Table 2), but we report t-statistics based on robust standard errors in any event.  OLS standard 
errors are qualitatively equivalent. 
6 One could interpret this advantage as either a simple historical artifact or as an inherent 
Republican advantage. 
7 The correlation coefficient between ARMY and ARMYSPEND is 0.40.  While modest,  
multicollinearity is addressed by combining the variables into ARMYDIFF.   The restriction that 
the coefficients on ARMY and ARMYSPEND are equal and opposite in sign in column three of 
Table 1 (or Table 2) is not rejected at the five percent level. 
 4
coefficients with the predicted signs. These estimates for the 1908-2000 period are similar to 
those for the 1916-2000 period presented in Fair (2002).  The second column in Table 2 adds 
ARMY and ARMYSPEND to eq. (5). Both variables have coefficients with the correct expected 
sign, and the coefficients are significant at the one percent level. In the final column of Table 2, 
the coefficient on ARMYDIFF is correctly signed and also significant at one percent. 
 
Estimates in Tables 1 and 2 suggest the statistical importance of the national security 
variables in explaining the popular vote for the President, and the results are robust to the 
differences in the two specifications.8   The effect is also numerically important in terms of 
actual vote share.  For example, in column three of Table 2, a shift in the value of ARMYDIFF 
from one-standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above yields an increase in 
the vote share (after reversing the log-odds transformation) of 4.2 percentage points, which is 
36.2% of the average winning margin of 11.6 percentage points in our sample.  Clearly, national 
security concerns can emerge as an important factor in the election outcome. 
 
                                       5. Alternative Specifications 
 
A central argument of this paper is that both opposing national defense variables are 
crucial to voting.  In fact, a simple test of omitted relevant variables supports this contention.     
For the second column of Table 1, dropping ARMY from the estimate causes ARMYSPEND to 
become insignificant, and dropping ARMYSPEND from the equation causes ARMY to become 
insignificant.9  And the exact same pattern is true for Table 2 -- dropping ARMY in column two 
causes ARMYSPEND to become insignificant, and vice versa.  This necessity of including both 
opposing dimensions of national security may help to explain why earlier studies, which tested 
only a single measure such as ARMY, were generally unsuccessful. 
 
 Reestimation using the traditional linear specification, where the dependent variable is 
the incumbent vote share V, rather than VOTE, the log-odds ratio of V, leads to very similar 
estimates regarding measures of fit and magnitudes of coefficients (after adjusting for the 
different functional form).  For example, linear estimation of the model in column three, Table 2, 
yields: 
  
       V = 54.21 -2.42 PARTY -0.15 PERSON -5.75 DURATION2 + 0.88 GOODNEWS 
            (24.84)  (-5.55)           (-0.11)              (-6.94)                          (4.35) 
                                                                                                                               SE = 1.89 
+ 4.35 WAR + 0.50 GROWTH - 1.09 INFLATION + 0.07 ARMYDIFF      R bar-squared=0.920 
  (2.90)            (6.16)                 (-6.02)                         (5.01)                               DW = 2.05 
 
                                                 
8 Partial F-tests reinforce the t-statistic evidence on the significance of the national security 
variables.  For example, addition of ARMY and ARMYSPEND to the second column of Table 1 
yields an F-statistic of 3.82, significant at five percent, and addition of the variables to the second 
column of Table 2 yields an F-statistic of 8.54, significant at one percent.   
9 Interactions between either of the military variables and economic growth or inflation (as in 
Haynes and Stone, 1994) are statistically insignificant, while the military variables still yield 
significant direct effects. 
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 A simple extension of the above models is implied by partisan or reputation models of 
voting (e.g., Swank 1993), where the response of voters to economic variables depends on the 
party of the incumbent President.  To evaluate this extension, we reestimate the models after 
permitting the coefficients on the growth and inflation variables and on ARMYDIFF to differ by 
the party of the incumbent President.  For the column three specification in both Tables 1 and 2, 
the null hypothesis of identical coefficients is not rejected at the five percent level (F statistics 
equal 2.32 and 0.408, respectively), supporting the symmetry restriction imposed across parties.   
 
6.  Implications for the 2004 Election and other War-Related Elections 
 
Although the two national security variables, ARMY and ARMYSPEND, are directly 
correlated, they appear to have distinct influences on Presidential voting since they enter with 
opposite signs.  An obvious question concerns the net influence of these national security 
variables in the 2004 Presidential election.  At this writing, the 2004 magnitude for ARMY is  
-0.005, indicting virtually no change over the past two years in the fraction of the population in 
the armed forces, yet the 2004 magnitude for ARMYSPEND is 26.88, indicating a dramatic 
increase in the fraction of government spending directed to national defense. These magnitudes, 
in combination with the parameter estimates on ARMY and ARMYSPEND in the two tables, 
suggest that President Bush's prospects for reelection are diminished by national security 
concerns. We explore this issue more formally in two related, but distinct ways.   
 
First, we compare out-of-sample forecasts for the 2004 election for the three estimates in 
each table, which are reported at the bottom of each column (for these comparisons we reverse 
the log-odds transformation to simplify the interpretation). In the first column in Table 1, which 
excludes national security, the predicted incumbent (in the current case, Republican) vote share 
for the 2004 election is 56.89. The prediction in the second column after adding ARMY and 
ARMYSPEND to the equation drops to 54.83, and the prediction in the final column after 
instead adding ARMYDIFF is 55.49. Repeating the same exercise for Table 2 yields forecasts of 
57.51 without the national security variables, 56.04 with ARMY and ARMYSPEND, and 55.51 
with ARMYDIFF.10  Comparing 2004 forecasts in the first column to those in the second and 
third columns across both Tables 1 and 2 indicates that national security concerns reduce the 
predicted 2004 vote share by an average of 1.73 percentage points. However, this approach has 
the potential drawback that coefficients on the other, non-military variables change (albeit 
modestly) after including the national security variables. 
 
A second method for measuring the impact of national security issues is to compute, 
using parameter estimates for a given specification, the separate effect of the 2004 magnitudes of 
ARMY and ARMYSPEND (or ARMYDIFF) on V, the vote share.11  For Table 1, this effect is  
-1.97 for column two, and -1.45 for column three.  And for Table 2, the effect is -1.65 for 
column two, and -1.85 for column three. The average of these four estimates is -1.73, i.e., a 
                                                 
10 A vote share of 57.51 is consistent with the base model estimate provided by Fair (2004) on 
his website: http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu/vote2004/vot0704.htm 
11 Since the equations are not linear, the computation involves netting out the influence of the 
non-military regressors prior to reversing the log-odds transformation. 
 6
decline in the predicted vote share attributed to national security issues which in fact is identical 
to that found in the first method.   
 
Thus, in either approach to calculating the influence of the national security concerns on 
the 2004 election, the predicted margin of victory is reduced by about one and three-quarters 
percentage points.  If one interprets the role of the PARTY dummy as an historical artifact, rather 
than an inherent Republican advantage, then the predicted vote share for President Bush is 
between 53 and 54 percent, regardless of the specification, which implies a closer election still, 
given the relevant confidence interval. 
 
The negative impact of national security for the 2004 election is, of course, specific to 
this election.  What impact do the magnitudes of ARMY and ARMYSPEND imply in other 
elections, especially during armed conflicts?  Given data on these variables for the 1944 
reelection bid of President Roosevelt and using parameter estimates in the third column of Tables 
1 and 2, we find that national defense concerns improve the incumbent vote share on average by 
2.22 percentage points, indicating that the "rally round the flag" factor dominates the opposing 
military cost factor during World War II.  However, the two more recent military conflicts have 
negative impacts on the Presidential vote share of the incumbent party -- the Korean war in the 
1952 election, with a shift of -1.71 percentage points, and the Vietnam war in the 1968 election, 
with a more modest shift of  -0.39 percentage points.  It is interesting to note that neither the 
incumbent President in 1952, President Truman, nor the incumbent President in 1968, President 
Johnson, chose to run for reelection, even though eligible to do so. In both cases, the Korean and 
Vietnam wars, respectively, were factors in the decision not to seek reelection.   
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
Clearly, the war in Iraq tends to overshadow the Presidential election of 2004.  However, 
the election appears to be relatively close in the polls, despite predictions from electoral models 
of an easy victory for President Bush. In this paper, we extend standard voting models to account 
for two opposing influences of national security and defense concerns. One we interpret as a 
“support the troops” or “rally round the flag” effect, captured empirically by the rate of change in 
the share of the population in uniform. The other is a measure of the economic cost of defense 
expenditures, which can draw support away from an incumbent.  These two forces, together, help 
to narrow the gap between current polls and the predictions from electoral models for the 
election of 2004, as the models predict a narrower Bush victory.  In addition, these forces help to 
explain the reelection success enjoyed by President Roosevelt in 1944, yet the difficulties faced 
by Presidents Truman and Johnson in their prospects for reelection in 1952 and 1968, had they 
chosen to run.  Numerically, the influence of national security concerns on vote share can be 
large relative to the average margin of victory and thus an important factor in the outcome of 
some elections.  Hence, we believe that these variables are a first step in improving our 
understanding of the complexity of national security and defense issues in Presidential elections.  
Alternative specifications of national security variables may also prove fruitful, e.g., the 
percentage change in troops abroad, the duration of troop deployments abroad in armed conflict, 
or war-related casualties.  Finally, we emphasize that our findings need to be tested in subsequent 
elections, especially given the small number of observations, and that no formula, however 
elaborate, can fully capture in advance voters’ decisions on the day of the election. 
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TABLE 1 
     Log-Odds Ratio of the Incumbent Share of Presidential Vote -- Eq. (4), 1908-2000 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable  Eq. (4)   Extension A  Extension B       
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept   0.26*                0.31**    0.31* 
   (2.31)              (3.91)              (3.49) 
PARTY  -0.90*              -0.06   -0.07 
             (-2.47)             (-1.47)             (-1.77) 
DURATION1  -0.68*              -0.07*   -0.08** 
             (-2.33)             (-2.57)             (-3.01) 
DOWJONES/100  0.55**    0.47**   0.46** 
   (3.31)   (3.39)   (3.52) 
GROWTH1/100        0.23**   2.02**   2.00** 
   (3.44)   (3.51)   (3.38) 
INFLATION1/100  -1.83   -2.93*                -2.31 
             (-1.24)             (-2.55)   (-1.94) 
ARMY/100       0.16* 
       (2.82) 
ARMYSPEND/100     -0.30* 
      (-2.34) 
ARMYDIFF/100       0.22** 
         (3.61) 
 
S.E.   0.148   0.135   0.135 
R bar-squared  0.701   0.752   0.754   
DW   2.18   2.07   2.27 
Number Obs.  24   24   24 
 
Pred. VOTE (2004) 56.89   54.83   55.49 
(Conf. Interval) ("4.00)  ("3.77)  ("3.69) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
**Significant at one percent level; *Significant at five percent level. 
Notes:  Sample is 1908 through 2000.  Dependent variable is VOTE, the log-odds ratio for V, the 
incumbent share of the two-party Presidential vote.  Equations are estimated with ordinary least 
squares, and robust (White) t-statistics are in parentheses.  See text for explanation of variables. 
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TABLE 2 
Log-Odds Ratio for the Incumbent Share of Presidential Vote -- Eq. (5), 1908-2000  
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable  Eq. (5)    Extension A  Extension B 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept   0.03      0.18     0.17 
   (0.27)     (2.01)    (1.91) 
PARTY  -0.11**    -0.10**   -0.10 
   (-5.90)    (-5.77)   (-5.48) 
PERSON   0.09    -0.01   -0.01 
   (1.45)    (-0.14)     (-0.11) 
DURATION2  -0.17**   -0.24**  -0.23** 
   (-3.15)    (-7.40)   (-6.89) 
GOODNEWS   0.04**   0.04**               0.04** 
   (2.99)    (4.32)   (4.36) 
WAR    0.16     0.19*     0.18* 
   (1.16)    (2.86)   (2.87) 
GROWTH2/100  2.49**     1.97**    2.06** 
   (4.65)    (5.32)    (6.13) 
INFLATION2/100 -3.47**   -4.40**   -4.36** 
             (-4.20)    (-5.85)   (-5.94) 
ARMY/100         0.33**    
       (4.64) 
ARMYSPEND/100       -0.25** 
       (-4.23) 
ARMYDIFF/100          0.28** 
           (5.01) 
 
S.E.   0.108     0.078   0.077 
R bar-squared  0.842     0.918   0.920 
DW   2.44     2.01   2.06 
Number Obs.  24    24   24 
 
Pred. Vote (2004) 57.51    56.04   55.51   
(Conf. Interval) ("3.25)   ("2.49)  ("2.36) 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
**Significant at one percent level; *Significant at five percent level. 
Notes:  Sample is 1908 through 2000.  Dependent variable is VOTE, the log-odds ratio of V, the 
incumbent share of the two-party Presidential vote. Equations are estimated with ordinary least 
squares, and robust (White) t-statistics are in parentheses.  See text for explanation of variables. 
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         DATA APPENDIX 
 
A. DATA FOR EQUATION (3), TABLE 1 
________________________________________________________________________ 
YEAR V PARTY DURA- DOW GROWTH1 INFLA- ARMY  ARMY- 
   TION1 JONES  TION1  SPEND 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1908 54.483 -1 3 37.8 -7.60 1.68 4.76 3.00 
1912 54.708 -1 4 16.7 4.08 1.71 3.25 0.69 
1916 51.682 1 1 12 6.38 7.73 2.33 4.04 
1920 36.119 1 2 -23.5 -6.14 8.01 -107.6 11.24 
1924 58.244 -1 1 6 -2.16 0.62 -3.38 -23.05 
1928 58.820 -1 2 31.3 -0.63 0.81 -0.48 10.15 
1932 40.841 -1 3 -25 -13.98 10.01 -2.97 -37.56 
1936 62.458 1 1 24.9 13.41 1.36 7.60 28.86 
1940 54.999 1 2 -12.9 6.97 0.53 16.79 8.33 
1944 53.774 1 3 9 6.88 1.98 53.10 17.16 
1948 52.370 1 4 6.3 3.77 10.39 -38.82 -86.56 
1952 44.595 1 5 -1.8 -0.34 2.66 43.89 71.59 
1956 57.764 -1 1 2.4 -0.69 3.59 -9.93 -14.34 
1960 49.913 -1 2 -13.9 -1.92 2.16 -4.10 -8.44 
1964 61.344 1 1 15.8 2.38 1.73 -3.68 -5.88 
1968 49.596 1 2 10 4.00 3.94 0.06 6.28 
1972 61.789 -1 1 5.4 5.05 5.17 -11.91 -19.71 
1976 48.948 -1 2 3 0.78 7.64 -2.56 -20.15 
1980 44.697 1 1 12.4 -5.69 8.99 -1.37 -0.44 
1984 59.170 -1 1 -6.9 2.69 3.68 -0.22 7.38 
1988 53.902 -1 2 12.6 2.43 3.30 -1.58 -1.09 
1992 46.545 -1 3 -0.9 1.34 3.15 -7.33 -10.11 
1996 54.736 1 1 24.5 3.08* 1.95* -5.62 -12.67 
2000 50.265 1 2 -5.0 2.95* 1.80* -2.00 1.83 
2004 NA -1 1 -5.9** 2.70* ** 1.88* ** -.005** 26.68** 
________________________________________________________________________ 
  * Based on GDP 1996 on, but on GNP in prior years. 
** Estimate 
Notes:  All data on V are from Fair (2002, p.5).  Data and sources on PARTY, DURATION1, DOWJONES, 
GROWTH1, INFLATION1, and ARMY from 1908 through 1992 are from Haynes and Stone (1994, p.126).  1996-
2004 updates on PARTY and DURATION1 follow from their definitions.  Updates on DOWJONES are from Dow 
Jones and Co.; GROWTH and INFLATION1 from the Bureau of Economic Analysis; and ARMY from U.S. Census 
Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Section 10: National Defense and Veterans Affairs.  Data on 
ARMYSPEND for years up to 1957 are from U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Statistics of the United States, 
Colonial Times to 1957; and subsequent to 1957 from U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
Section 9: Federal Government Finances and Employment.   
 
B. DATA FOR EQUATION (4), TABLE 2 
 
Except for ARMY and ARMYSPEND, data and sources from 1908 through 2000 are from Fair (2002, 
p.5), http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu/RAYFAIR/PDF/2002DHTM.HTM , and for 2004 are from Fair 
(2004), http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu/vote2004/vot0704.htm .  See above for data and sources on ARMY 
and ARMYSPEND. 
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